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Comportements de placement des acteurs clés du capitalisme : quand la 
géographie compte 
Résumé 
L’article s’inscrit dans une réflexion en termes d’économie géographique et se veut une 
contribution à l’analyse de la finance globale : plus précisément, il propose d’éclairer 
notre compréhension de la structure et du fonctionnement des marchés financiers 
internationaux. L’objectif est de s’interroger  sur la géographie de la finance à travers 
une analyse du comportement de placement des grands détenteurs d'actions 
internationaux avec un focus particulier sur le comportement des investisseurs 
institutionnels. 
Les arguments en faveur de cette étude sont multiples et clairement recensés dans les 
travaux académiques  : d’abord, l'importance des flux financiers internationaux de 
capitaux et en particulier l’importance des transactions financières par rapport aux 
transactions sur le marché des biens et services  ; ensuite, le développement d’une 
industrie des fonds de pension aux Etats-Unis et plus globalement d’une industrie de 
services financiers autour des investisseurs institutionnels ; enfin, le rôle des 
investisseurs institutionnels comme acteurs clés du capitalisme à travers leurs détentions 
d'actions dans les grandes sociétés cotées, les pratiques de Corporate Governance qu’ils 
impulsent ou encore leurs exigences de création de valeur pour l’actionnaire.  
L’objectif de cet article exploratoire est triple. 1) Nous proposons d’abord une 
représentation des grands détenteurs internationaux d’actions pour contribuer à une 
meilleure compréhension de la structure des marchés d’actions. 2) Nous analysons 
ensuite le comportement de placement de ces grands acteurs (montants des portefeuilles 
gérés, typologie des grands détenteurs d’actions, analyse du turn-over de leurs 
portefeuilles et des styles de placement des différents gestionnaires) en accordant une 
place très particulière à l’analyse des investisseurs institutionnels internationaux en tant 
qu’acteurs clés du capitalisme. 3) Nous expliquons enfin le comportement de 
placement de ces acteurs en intégrant leur origine géographique.  
Mots-clés :  géographie, finance, investisseurs institutionnels, modèles de 
capitalisme, court-termisme, institutions 
 
Investment behaviors of the key actors in capitalism: when geography 
matters 
Abstract 
The article investigates the geography of finance via an analysis of the investment 
behavior of large international equity investors. The main argument is based on the 
importance of financial markets and capital flows and on the central role played in them 
by institutional investors, the key actors of capitalism. This paper is original because it 
introduces geographic criteria, and thus institutional and cultural factors, for 
understanding the behaviour of investors. We present evidence on the diversity of models 
of capitalism while questioning the convergence of national economies and markets 
towards a pattern often termed “the Anglo-Saxon model”. 
Key words: institutional investors, geography of finance, models of capitalism, 
financial markets 
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1. Introduction 
This article develops a perspective of economic geography and sets out to contribute to 
the analysis of global finance. It proposes to shed light on our understanding of the structure 
and functioning of international financial markets (Clark, 2005; Pike, 2006; Williams, 2000). 
The objective is to investigate the geography of finance via an analysis of the investment 
behavior of large international equity investors. More precisely, through a study of 
international institutional investors, the paper contributes to the research that asserts that 
“geography matters”
 1. We validate the thesis according to which geography of finance is an 
essential component of global behaviors of institutional investors (Clark, Wojcik, 2003). 
There are three main arguments in favor of our study, and they are clearly identified in 
the literature. The first one is the sheer volume of international capital flows, and in particular 
the volume of financial transactions compared to the flow of traded goods and services (Clark, 
2005; Morin, 2006)
2; the second is the development of a pension fund industry in the USA, 
and more generally of a financial services industry around institutional investors (Clark, 1999; 
Orléan, 1999; O’Sullivan, 2000; Plihon, Ponssard, 2002; Aglietta, Rebérioux, 2004; Lavigne, 
2004); the third argument is the role of institutional investors as key actors in capitalism, via 
their shareholdings in the big listed companies, their corporate governance practices, and their 
demands for the creation of shareholder value (Clark, 1999  ; Hawley, Williams, 2000). 
Institutional investors have inflected corporate governance policies towards greater 
transparency and effective recognition of shareholder interests. Today they are accused of 
contributing, via their excessive demands for profitability, to the financialization of 
economies and corporate strategies. Cited in support of this view is the observation that 
company valuation is now conducted within an ever-shorter time perspective, a phenomenon 
that can also be seen in the evolution of companies’ market capitalization. 
This article is an exploratory one, and it has three main objectives:  
1.  To offer a representation of the large international equity investors, in order to 
contribute to a better understanding of stock markets structure 
2.  To analyze the investment behavior of these actors with a particular focus on the key 
actors in capitalism, namely international institutional investors. 
3.  To explain these actors’ investment behavior in terms of their geographic origin. 
Indeed, if all studies today recognize the importance of international capital flows, few 
investigate the origin of these flows (Clark, 2005)
3. We therefore propose to introduce 
the geographic factor as a means to link international capital flows and actors to the 
geography of capitalism. More fundamentally, we wish to highlight the importance of 
cultural factors and the institutional context for an understanding of actors’ investment 
behaviors. In this sense, our work falls well within the academic work of La Porta et 
al. (2000) on the influence of the law for the development of financial markets and by 
the founding studies of Granovetter (1985) on social embeddedness. 
                                                 
* Professor, Université Bordeaux IV, Gretha UMR CNRS 5113, claude.dupuy@u-bordeaux.fr 
** Professor, Toulouse Business School and Université Toulouse 1 (LEREPS-Gres), s.lavigne@esc-toulouse.fr 
1 We refer to the pioneers work of Krugman (1991) according to which “geography matters”. 
2 Transactions in the currency markets reached, in 2002, $384,400 billion versus $32,300 billion for goods and 
services transactions, a fact which confirms the domination of the financial sphere over the real one (Morin, 
2006). 
3 “While it is commonplace to recognize that daily global financial flows are massive and ever growing, we tend 
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If this article begins with an empirical study of the investment behavior of institutional 
investors, it participates more fundamentally in the theoretical debate on the convergence of 
models of capitalism. Indeed, are we witnessing a convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon 
model, said to be a “finance-driven” one (Williams, 2000; Froud et al, 2000), or can we 
conclude instead that “national varieties of capitalism” still persist (Hall, Soskice, 2001)? 
2. Institutional investors, the key actors of capitalism 
We first specify the concept of institutional investors and then try to describe their 
investment behaviors on global stock markets, the idea being to understand the link between 
financial flows and space. 
2.1 Large equity investors on international markets 
International institutional investors managed $27,000 billion in assets in 2002 in the 
OECD as whole, with American investors alone managing $19,500 billion, thus occupying a 
hegemonic position (Plihon, Ponsard, 2002). In reality, behind the term “institutional 
investor” there hides a multitude of actors who are nevertheless in the same business, that of 
financial intermediation. The category of institutional investor, defined in numerous academic 
works, includes pension funds, mutual funds (also called money managers, investment 
advisors, or third-party fund managers), hedge funds, and insurance companies. A short 
description of these actors is given below. 
-  Pension funds are financial institutions that collect pension contributions from public 
or private-sector employees and “put the money to work” in the financial markets, 
then pay it out again in the form of post-retirement income. Pension funds developed 
mainly in countries that finance retirement via self-funded retirement plans, especially 
the USA and the UK, and they hardly exist at all in continental Europe (Davis, 1995). 
Public pension funds are governed by American state laws, while private pension 
funds operate under the terms of the ERISA law of 1974. This law distinguishes 
between defined benefit funds, which promise the employee-saver a specified monthly 
benefit at retirement, and defined contribution funds, which are based on defined 
contributions by the employer-contributor and promise no specific monthly benefit. 
-  Mutual funds are collective investment vehicles that raise funds from various sources 
(private individuals, companies, or other institutional investors) and use them to 
acquire financial assets. They are managed by investment companies and their 
objective is to invest in a diversified portfolio of financial assets. At the end of  2003, 
there were close to 8,000 mutual funds in the USA managing approximately $7,000 
billion worth of assets, placing the USA first in the investment management industry 
(Lavigne, 2004). 
-  Hedge funds are collective asset management vehicles that practice alternative 
investment strategies. In contrast to classic mutual funds, they aim for performance 
that is uncorrelated with stock or bond market trends. As they are often domiciled 
offshore, they are not subject to regulatory or disclosure requirements. They are free to 
use all types of financial instruments without restriction, from classic equity and debt 
traded on the stock and bond markets to the most risky derivative instruments traded 
on the futures market, typically using a large proportion of borrowed funds to take 
advantage of positive leverage effects. At the end of 1997, there were about 3,000 
hedge funds managing 1% of all assets managed by institutional investors (Plihon, 
Ponssard, 2002). 
-  Insurance companies offer products that aim to protect subscribers from the risk of Investment behaviors of the key actors in capitalism: when geography matters 
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financial loss due to the occurrence of a particular event, even if in certain countries 
they may provide pension funds with portfolio management services. This sector is 
dominated by the USA and Japan, followed by the UK, France and Germany. 
In all countries, one can observe a trend towards institutionalization, understood as the 
growth in financial assets managed by institutional investors. The obvious corollary of this is 
the erosion of the banks’ share of financial intermediation. However, it is mainly in the USA 
and the UK where these investors have most developed. Thus, in the USA, institutional 
investors hold 60% of the capital of the S&P 500 companies and 25% of total American 
market capitalization (Hawley, Williams, 2000). 
Much work has been done to characterize the investment behavior of American 
institutional investors (Morin, 1998; Clark, 1999; Hawley, Williams, 2000; Baudru et al., 
2001; Plihon, Ponsard, 2002; Aglietta, Rebérioux, 2004; Lavigne, 2004, Dupuy, Lung, 2002). 
In particular, these studies made it possible to highlight: 
-  A concentration on one segment of the market: that of large caps, since 74% of 
their portfolios are invested in companies with a market cap of over $5 billion 
(Lavigne, 2004) 
-  A concentration on one asset class: these investors, on average, allocate 65% of 
their portfolios to equity (Plihon, Ponsard, 2002) 
-  A dominant model of fund management
4: the management of the defined 
contribution plans by mutual funds. This model is characterized by a high portfolio 
turnover rate, and an aggressive investment strategy marked by a large equity 
allocation and the holding of significant equity stakes in corporations (Baudru et 
al, 2001) 
-  A herd behavior: indeed, one can observe a uniformity in the behavior of fund 
managers, as their performance is evaluated with reference to standardized 
benchmarks such as the S&P 500 index. Fund managers are in competition with 
each other in the investment management industry: indeed, obtaining mandates is 
based on quarterly evaluations of managers’ performance relative to that of their 
peers. A direct consequence of this system is the shortening of the investment time 
horizon, since managers must produce high returns in the short term to keep their 
mandates and win new ones. A more fundamental consequence is the emergence 
of imitative behaviors, which constitute a factor of instability on stock markets 
(Orléan, 1999).  
These academic works on institutional investors, however, tends to neglect the 
geographic origin of these actors. And yet the geography of finance matters! 
2.2. The geography of finance 
The notion of geography of finance invites one to turn to economic geography in order 
to determine to what extent the work in this area can contribute to a better understanding of 
global finance (Clark, 2005). The main argument in favor of a geography of global finance is 
clearly linked to the sheer volume of capital flows and to the importance of financial markets 
since the early 1990s (Clark,  Wojcik, 2007). It is also linked to the development of a 
financial services industry that occupies a fundamental place in modern capitalism:  the 
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financial system and its principal actors today dominate the real economy of goods and 
services (Martin, Minns, 1995; Clark, 1999). 
The economic geography research field has already addressed this question in a growing 
number of studies and in particular those on: 
-  the concentration of market actors in just a few financial centers (including London 
and New York) (Clark, 2002), 
-  the geographic embeddedness of the financial system (Harvey, 1989; Clark, 
O’Connor, 1997) and the inherent geographic foundations of financial capitalism 
(Harvey, 1989) 
-  the effects of financialization and shareholder value practices on spatialized social 
relations in Sunderland (Pike, 2006)  
-  the study of analysts’ pratices in London’s corporate finance industry through the use 
of quantitative financial narratives used by analysts to legitimize their financial 
techniques  (Hall, 2006). 
-  the importance of spatial relationship and processes of local embeddedness in the 
interest rate swaps industry in Australia (Agnes, 2000) 
If some studies have already been carried out on the links between geography and 
finance, rare are those that focus on international capital flows. And if it is now recognized 
that these flows are massive and constantly increasing, few works address the question of the 
origin of these flows (Clark, 2005). The goal of this exploratory article is clearly to investigate 
the origin of these financial flows and to determine to what extent the behaviour of large 
equity investors can be explained by their geographical attachment. In other words, the 
objective is to investigate the geographical embeddedness of capital flows. 
Indeed, the development of the financial sphere is not taking place in a globalized space 
in which national borders have been erased, but rather within a geographic space made up of 
discontinuities—geographical, cultural and institutional. This geographical space is a 
constraint for investors. Two stylized effects (the home bias and the Tesar-Werner effect) 
clearly show this: investors make a clear distinction between investing at home and investing 
abroad, and their time horizon shortens significantly as investment moves to foreign 
countries. Investors prefer to invest in countries that are close geographically and culturally, 
especially in terms of language. Numerous studies have highlighted this preference for 
domestic investing: for instance, Huberman (2000) demonstrates that American investors 
prefer to invest locally, Portes and Rey (2005) show that distance matters in international 
capital movements and Coval and Moskowitz (1999), on their side, examine shareholdings by 
American investors and conclude to a strong local preference, including within the USA. 
Finally, investors do not take complete advantage of the gains to be obtained from 
international diversification. 
Then, it should be stresses that studies have focused on certain geographic markets: 
Falkenstein (1996) studied investors’ strategies in the American market, while Kang and Stulz 
(1997) did the same for Japan, as did Dahlquist and Robertsson (2003) for Sweden. Only one 
comparative study, to our knowledge, examines asset allocation (Dalhquist et al., 2003), and 
reveals a home bias in funds’ investment behavior, with American investors having a strong 
preference for American issues. These effects have also been highlighted by sectoral studies 
which found evidence on the preference of American institutional investors for the financial 
or the technological industries (Baudru, Lavigne 2001; Dupuy, Lung 2002).  Investment behaviors of the key actors in capitalism: when geography matters 
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3. When the geography of finance matters: behavior 
explained by investors’ geographic origin 
Four many academic works, the concept of model of capitalism is indissociable from 
that of geographic space. In his reference book, Capitalisme contre Capitalisme, Albert (1991) 
highlights the triumph of this system and compares two models of capitalism that he qualifies 
in geographic terms. He contrasts the “neo-American” model (the USA, the UK, Canada) 
with the Germano-Japanese or “Rhenish” model (Germany, Switzerland, the Benelux, 
northern Europe, and, in certain respects, Japan). If the Anglo-Saxon model stresses the 
central role of the stock market, the individual success and the pursuit of short-term profits, 
the Rhenish model highlights the role of banks in the financing of the economy. Albert (1991) 
shows that, despite the economic and social superiority of the Rhenish model, the neo-
American model is gradually establishing itself as the reference model. 
The work of Morin and Dupuy (1993) takes up this dualistic conception by contrasting 
the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism (the USA, Canada, the UK) with the continental or 
Rhenish one (Germany, Switzerland, and, by extension, Japan). As for French capitalism, for 
much of its history situated midway between the Anglo-Saxon and Rhenish models, it has 
undertaken a deregulation of its financial market that favors the stock market over the banks. 
Other works also investigate the varieties of capitalism, such as the reference work by Hall 
and Soskice (2001), Varieties of Capitalism, which has become the flagship of all the studies 
on the diversity of capitalist economies. These works undertake the comparative study of 
models of capitalism on the basis of how they coordinate their activities: companies can either 
count on the market or rely on non-market modes of coordination.  
While the object of this paper is not to inventory all the studies on the variety or the 
convergence of models of capitalism, we can nevertheless point out that the majority of 
studies lead one to relativize this notion of convergence of national models of capitalism 
towards a single model, that of the USA. The analysis of large international equity investors 
will enable us to address this issue directly. We will see whether these actors have the same 
investment behavior across all geographic zones, and in this sense converge in a 
homogenisation of models of capitalism, or whether, on the contrary, they have specific 
behaviors linked to particular geographic zones, and so validate the postulate of a continuing 
variety of models of capitalism.  
3.1. The sample  
We analyze the investment behaviour of the major actors of capitalism using a sample 
of 11,918 actors each managing an equity portfolio of over $20 million
5. We distinguish 11 
types of investors who can invest across 7 geographic zones which are often the archetype of 
a model of capitalism. For example, the North American zone is seen as that of a financial 
market economy, while the European zone is said to be characterized by the relative 
preponderance of banks, families and State in the financing of companies. 
Among the shareholders, we consider successively 
-  corporations: industrial or family holding companies, or corporations with strategic 
stakes in other firms 
                                                 
5 Data from Thomson One Banker Ownership (TOBO) database which lists international capital flows and 
presents investors’ equity portfolios across all stock markets. Investment behaviors of the key actors in capitalism: when geography matters 
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-  public agencies: State or local governments 
-  individuals: direct shareholdings by private individuals 
-  banks and trusts 
-  insurance companies 
-  pension funds 
-  mutual funds (investment advisors) 
-  hedge funds 
-  private equity 
-  university endowment funds 
-  broker/dealers (called research firms) who buy and sell for third parties. 
Two methodological points need to be clarified concerning this typology of actors. 
Firstly, the database enables one to analyze only the direct holdings of each type of 
actor. Thus, the asset management subsidiaries of banks and insurance companies are not 
listed in the category of banks or insurance companies, but rather in that of investment 
advisors. We therefore measure only the traditional shareholdings of banks and insurance 
companies, since their asset management businesses are accounted for in the mutual funds 
category. Note that since the deregulation of banking, banks have moved massively into asset 
management as a means to reduce their risks and the cyclicality of their earnings: a study 
conducted in 2004 by the Investment Company Institute showed that the number of mutual 
funds sponsored by banks was 1,100 in 1991, 2,072 in 1994 and over 5,000 in 2004. 
Insurance companies, for their part, are subject to specific regulations. Thus, in the USA, they 
cannot own more than 5% of a firm’s capital. Moreover, legislation encourages them to 
concentrate their investments on real estate and high grade debt, with the result that only 5 to 
20% of their assets can be freely allocated (Plihon, Ponsard, 2002). 
In the same way, the database only lists large pension funds, often defined benefit funds 
that are directly managed and have a conservative investment policy (Baudru, Lavigne, 2001; 
Plihon, Ponssard, 2002). Since the ERISA law of 1974 and the creation of 401(k) funds in 
1978 in the USA, we have seen the rise of defined contribution pension funds that promise no 
specified payout and delegate management to mutual funds. Overall, it is estimated that 
American pension funds delegate over 60% of their assets to mutual funds. Our analysis 
therefore underestimates the financial weight of pension funds, since the management of a 
large portion of their assets is “outsourced” to mutual funds.  
For each type of large institutional investor, we examine several variables: 
-  the amount of their portfolios of financial assets 
-  their geographic origin  
-  the allocation of their portfolios by geographic zone, in order to identify particular 
investment behaviors of the Tesa-Werner effect type 
-  their portfolio turnover rate, qualified as low, medium or high, and enabling one to 
identify the most volatile investors, in other words the investors capable of 
destabilising equity markets. 
3.2. Evidence on the large institutional investors behaviors 
The data, from September 2005, relates to 11,918 investors managing $21.77 trillion in 
financial assets, or 60% of global market capitalization. Let us note immediately that 64.86% 
of these assets are held by mutual fund managers, a fact that confirms the key role of mutual 
funds in the main stock markets. The share represented by banks (5.94%), pension funds Investment behaviors of the key actors in capitalism: when geography matters 
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(4.72%) and insurance companies (2.72%) is marginal, but one must recall that a big 
proportion of their activity – their asset management divisions – is accounted for in the 
category of mutual funds. 
Table 1: Types of investors (in number of entities then in billions of dollars) 
Entities %/Total $bn %/Total
Investment Advisor 2 356 19,78% 14 125 200 64,86%
Private Equity 342 2,87% 108 640 0,50%
Research Firm 100 0,84% 369 555 1,70%
Pension Fund 200 1,68% 1 028 900 4,72%
Hedge Fund 715 6,00% 617 499 2,84%
Total Institutional Investors 3 713 31,18% 16 249 794 74,61%
Insurance Company 274 2,30% 587 336 2,70%
Bank and Trust 788 6,62% 1 293 240 5,94%
Total Banks an Insurances 1 062 8,92% 1 880 576 8,64%
Public Agency 67 0,56% 89 059 0,41%
Corporation 6 975 58,56% 3 337 860 15,33%
Endowment fund 16 0,13% 19 987 0,09%
Individuals 77 0,65% 201 113 0,92%
Total Strategic Investors 7 135 59,91% 3 648 019 16,75%
Total 11 910 100,00% 21 778 389 100,00%  
             Source TOBO, 2005 
If “institutional investors” (pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, private equity, 
broker/dealers) represent only 31% of the equity investors in our sample, they manage 
74.61% of the assets, a fact which confirms once more the power of these actors in the equity 
markets. 
Concerning the origin of the large equity investors, let us note that if, in number, the 
shareholdings between major zones are relatively balanced, in value North American 
shareholders represent 61.76% of global market capitalization versus 26.93% for European 
shareholders and 8.64% for Asian equity investors (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Distribution of investors according to their geographic origin 
 
number % / Total $ MM % / Total
North America 3,498 29.37 13,450,000 61.76 
Europe 3,442 28.90 5,864,410 26.93 
Asia 3,791 31.83 1,882,300 8.64 
South/Central America  551 4.63 245,374 1.13 
Australasia 288 2.42 196,024 0.90 
Africa  164 1.38 96,924 0.45 
Middle East 176 1.48 43,398 0.20 
Total 11,910 100.00 21,778,429 100.00 
 
A more detailed analysis realized at the country level shows that 58.99% of global 
assets are held by investors of American origin, a fact which again confirms the domination of 
the USA in global asset management (and this despite the fact that the figure underestimates 
their true level, because offshore subsidiaries of American firms are not included). As for the 
weight of Europe in the geography of global finance, large equity investors from the UK Investment behaviors of the key actors in capitalism: when geography matters 
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represent 9.44% of global market capitalization compared to 5.31% for large Japanese 
shareholders, 3.59% for the Germans, and 3.42% for the French. 
It now becomes interesting to investigate the geographic origin of the various types of 
investors, in order to answer the question of whether investment advisers largely come from 
North America, and whether banking actors are mainly concentrated in Europe. In other 
words, it is a matter of inquiring into the maintenance of national models of capitalism, via 
the associations that might be established between a particular type of equity investor and a 
given geographic zone. 
Table 3: Distribution of investors according to their type and geographic origin 
(in %) Source : TOBO, 2005. 
 
The data enable one to demonstrate institutional specialization by geographic zone, and 
support the thesis of geography of capitalism, in other words the existence of national models 
of capitalism. The data do indeed tend to confirm the financial market economy character of 
the North American zone: the majority of hedge funds, investment advisors, pension funds, 
private equity, and individual shareholdings are North American. For example, of the global 
total, 79.6% of pension funds, 96.1% of hedge funds and 73.7% of investment advisors are 
from the North American zone. Conversely, the Japanese model shows the importance of 
bank financing, insurance companies, and industrial shareholdings. As for the European 
model, it shows intermediate characteristics which tend to place it in the category of a rhenish 
model rather than a financial market economy model. Indeed, the European model remains 
one of State capitalism, since 73.9% of all State shareholdings are concentrated in the 
European zone. This model is also characterized by relatively preponderant banking and 
industrial shareholdings, even if once can now observe the emergence of an investment 
management industry. Indeed, 22.5% of all investment advisors are now concentrated in the 
European zone. Investment behaviors of the key actors in capitalism: when geography matters 
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A fundamental dimension of our study concerns the portfolio turnover rate of large 
equity investors worldwide. The economic and financial presses, as well as numerous 
academic studies, often associate Anglo-American capitalism with a short term vision. The 
European or Japanese models, in contrast, are said to have a medium to long term horizon. 
Given this perception, it is necessary to inquire into the link that may exist between a type of 
investor, its geographic origin, and its portfolio turnover. The debate on this question is of 
great importance, both in the USA and in Europe and this phenomenon is well captured in a 
Wall Street Journal article of 30 September 2004: “Ahead of the tape: Turn, turn, turn”. 
Equity portfolio turnover has become a fundamental evaluation criterion for the financial 
community, and the Securities and Exchange Commission now requires that every mutual 
fund publish its turnover rate. A 100% turnover rate means that the entire portfolio was traded 
over a one-year period; a 10% turnover rate indicates a time horizon of ten years to achieve 
the turnover of the entire portfolio. There is no systematic historical study on the portfolio 
turnover of the various large equity investors. The only historical studies concern mutual fund 
activity. Thus, the Investment Company Institute, in a 2004 study, showed that since 1999 
there has been an acceleration in the average turnover rate of mutual funds: 80% on average 
in 1999 versus 115% since then. In other words, the time horizon of mutual funds, key actors 
in global stock markets, is now less than one year. 
But what can one say concerning the turnover of the other types of investors? Can one 
associate specific rates of portfolio rotation with specific types of investors and geographic 
zone? 
The Thomson One Banker Ownership database provides, for each type of investors, the 
annual turnover rate in terms of the following classification: portfolios with a holding period 
of over 36 months are termed “low turnover”; those held from 18 to 36 months are termed 
“medium turnover”, and those held for less than 18 months are termed “high turnover”. The 
data enables us to characterize the volatility of the portfolios of the large global equity 
investors of our sample. 
Table 4: Portfolio turnover of large equity investors 
   Number  %/Total 
high  1,384 16.48% 
medium  1,060 30.9% 
low  792 29,2% 
zero  8,674 23.35% 
Total  11,910 100.00% 
   
The overall picture of turnover rates reveals the prudent investment character of the 
majority of the actors in our sample, since 52.55% of them are characterized by a null or low 
turnover of their portfolios, and thus have medium to long term investment horizons.  Investment behaviors of the key actors in capitalism: when geography matters 
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The data reveal that the most volatile investors are the hedge funds (68% of them have a 
high turnover), followed by the investment advisors (29.8 % with a high turnover), then the 
endowment funds and broker/dealers. As for the least volatile actors, they are the State, 
individual, and industrial investors, with zero turnover. The banks, insurance companies, and 
pension funds occupy a middle position, having a medium to long term investment horizon. 
These results show that the real liquidity of the markets is provided by a few actors who 
are very active in terms of portfolio rotation, with an investment horizon of less than 18 
months. If the overall contribution of the relatively unregulated actors to the liquidity of the 
markets as a whole is limited in value (hedge funds being a good example), their presence is 
nevertheless essential to ensuring the markets’ real liquidity. Indeed, in the absence of these 
actors, the liquidity of the markets would be significantly lower. In fact, the real liquidity of 
the markets is limited even during periods of regular liquidity: the illusion of liquidity is 
sustained only by the high activity rates of certain investors. 
4. Towards a synthesis on the links between a type of 
investor, its geographic origin and its portfolio turnover? 
The preceding elements enable one to confirm the existence of continental forms of 
capitalism, by identifying types of equity investor and specific behavior to each geographic 
zone. The data do not, however, furnish complete information on the international variety of 
shareholdings. We therefore propose a multiple component analysis to measure the links 
between investors’ geographic origin, type of equity investor, and portfolio turnover. This 
analysis is complemented with a classificatory analysis that enables one to identify five 
classes of different type of investors (see Appendix 1). 
Class 1 is the archetype of Asian zone capitalism marked by a high proportion of 
industrial shareholdings and a null portfolio turnover. Class 1 refers to Asian zone holdings, 
accounting for 79.82% of all participants in this one class but only 31.83% of the total 
sample. 44.76% of all Japanese investors are included in this class. Class 1 represents 98.33% 
of investors from Japan, 99.21% of investors from Taiwan, 99.76% of Chinese investors and 
90.31% of Hong Kong investors. 92.63% of the class is characterised by (other) Industrial Investment behaviors of the key actors in capitalism: when geography matters 
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Holdings, 98.24% of which feature zero turnover. It includes 4,479 investors. This class is the 
archetype of Asian capitalism. 
Class 2 characterizes the European zone, largely marked by the relative preponderance 
of industrial shareholdings, the role of banks and insurance companies. Class 2 is a neighbour 
to Class 1 but much more diversified. 74.19% of European investors belong to this class. It is 
also characterised by holdings with zero portfolio turnover (94.13%) and specifically includes 
holdings by various investors with mainly industrial origins (83.32%) (European: France, 
Germany, UK, Switzerland). Class 2 also includes very different investors, ranging from 
Insurance Companies to Banks. The countries whose shareholders are closer to this class are 
France (89.4%), Switzerland (90.87%), Germany (85.98%), the UK (73.38%) and to a lesser 
extent Canada (49.83%). 59.85% of all Insurance Companies and 53.3% of all Banks belong 
to Class 2, which covers 3,747 investors, or 31.46% of the sample.  
Class 3, focused geographically on the Australian zone, is characterized by industrial 
shareholdings and a null portfolio turnover 
Class 4 is that of the North American hedge funds, actors characterized by high 
portfolios turnover 
Class 5, concentrated in the North American zone, brings together the investment 
advisors and, to a lesser degree, private equity firms. This class is the archetype of “fiduciary 
capitalism”, devoted to asset management and characterized by an heterogeneity of  portfolios 
turnover. Class 5 is largely (76.78%) comprised of Investment Advisors (and to a lesser extent 
[8.12%] of Private Equities). The class accounts for 28.23% of low turnover investors and 
35.96% of moderate turnover investors are concentrated here. 
Graph 1: Classes of equity investors and geographic zones 
 
This first graph reveals a fundamental opposition between investors of the Asian class 
(class 1) and those of the North American zone (classes 4 and 5), with investors of the Investment behaviors of the key actors in capitalism: when geography matters 
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European zone (class 2) occupying an intermediate position. The opposition between 
geographic zones concerns the portfolio turnover rate, in other words the stable or volatile 
character of the respective stock markets and, ultimately, of the models of capitalism. Indeed, 
if portfolio turnover is high in the North American zone, it is null in the Asian zone, with 
Europe being historically close to the Asian model but evolving towards investment horizons 
similar to those of class 5 actors. The graph enables one to measure the gradual evolution of 
the European zone towards the North American model of asset management. One can also 
observe that if class one is homogenous, class 2 equity investors are, institutionally and 
geographically, much more diversified.  
A more detailed analysis makes it possible to associate a type of investor with a given 
geographic zone . 
Graph 2: Type of equity investors and geographic areas 
 
  Not surprisingly, the North American zone highlights the relative preponderance of 
hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, private equity and endowment funds. North 
American capitalism is characterized by the co-existence featuring relatively long investment 
horizon (investment advisors with low and moderate turn-over) witch much more aggressive 
actors (hedge funds). American capitalism is clearly financial oriented but its short-term 
aspect is not as obvious as previously believed.  The Asian zone highlights the strategic role 
of industrial shareholdings and the State. As for the European zone, if it remains marked by 
the relative preponderance of families, State, industrial shareholdings, banks and insurance 
companies, one must nevertheless note the evolution of European shareholder behaviour 
towards a rapprochement with that of their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, and in particular with 
the behaviours of investment advisors. It is especially banks and insurance companies that 
tend to adopt the same behaviour as the American mutual funds, allowing certain studies to 
affirm the convergence of the different models of capitalism towards the Anglo-Saxon 
reference.  
 Investment behaviors of the key actors in capitalism: when geography matters 
  - 13 -
5. Conclusion 
Our results lead us to support that “geography matters” in demonstrating the existence 
of a link between finance and space through the persistence of different national financial 
systems. Clearly, our exploratory study on international financial flows reveals the 
maintenance of regional models of capitalism: 
-  first, an Asian capitalism, characterized by the relative preponderance of the State and 
industrial shareholdings, and by near-zero portfolio turnover 
-  next, a North American capitalism that highlights the relative preponderance of 
institutional investors, characterized by a portfolio turnover that is very high (the case 
for hedge funds and private equity) or low or moderate (the case for mutual funds) 
-  finally, the European zone, positioned in an intermediate or dualistic situation. If this 
zone continues to be marked by family or State capitalism, or by a strong alliance 
between banking and industry, and is characterized by zero or near-zero portfolio 
rotation rates, it must be stressed that it is gradually shifting towards the North 
American model. Indeed, since the mid-1990s, the European zone has been 
developing an asset management industry comparable to the North American mutual 
funds industry.  
In a sense, this exploratory paper can be used to feed the debate on the geography of 
finance. Indeed, it highlights the national or regional specificities of models of capitalism. In 
other words, it underlines the fundamental importance of geography for the understanding of 
the investment behavior of large equity investors and, by extension, of the different models of 
capitalism. More generally, it argues for the taking into account of the geographic factor, the 
geographic space being understood as a set of institutional, cultural and social rules capable of 
guiding or constraining actors’ behavior. Above all, it enables one to inquire into the 
convergence of investment behavior on stock markets by showing the evolution of European 
actors’ behavior towards that of American institutional investors. For all that, it does not 
allow one to make a final argument for a homogenizing vision that would claim that 
American capitalism has established itself across all the world’s stock markets, or that the 
American model is characterized only by very short term investment horizons… 
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Global Region  C8=Asia  79,82 31,83 94,30 91,85  3791
Country  C7=Japan  44,76 17,12 98,33 65,61  2039
Investor Type  C3=Corporation 90,87 58,56 58,35 58,94  6975
Turnover  C5=Zero  98,24 72,83 50,73 54,79  8674
Style  C4=Others  92,63 64,74 53,81 53,03  7711
Country  C7=Taiwan  11,21 4,25 99,21 31,15  506
Country  C7=China  9,13 3,44 99,76 28,37  410
Country  C7=Hong Kong 5,83 2,43 90,31 18,94  289
Style  C4=Employees 4,80 3,32 54,29 6,80  396
 














Global Region  C8=Europe  74,19 28,90 80,77 73,78  3442
Turnover  C5=Zero  94,13 72,83 40,66 38,77  8674
Style  C4=Others  83,32 64,74 40,49 29,84  7711
Global Region  South/Central Americ 12,54 4,63 85,30 26,87  551
Country  C7=France  10,81 3,80 89,40 26,31  453
Country  C7=United Kingdom 14,20 6,09 73,38 23,94  725
Country  C7=Germany  7,53 2,75 85,98 20,77  328
Country  C7=Switzerland 5,84 2,02 90,87 19,52  241
Investor Type  C3=Corporation 70,19 58,56 37,71 17,63  6975
Investor Type  C3=Bank & Trust 11,21 6,62 53,30 13,12  788
Investor Type  C3=Insurance Company 4,38 2,30 59,85 9,73  274
Country  C7=Canada  3,98 2,51 49,83 6,63  299
Style  C4=Employees  4,75 3,32 44,95 5,66  396
 














Global Region  C8=Australasia  80,45 2,42 100,00 48,43  288
Country  C7=Australia  76,54 2,30 100,00 46,96  274
Style  C4=Others  83,80 64,74 3,89 8,07  7711
Turnover  C5=Zero  88,55 72,83 3,65 7,29  8674
Investor Type  C3=Corporation 72,35 58,56 3,71 5,44  6975
 














Investor Type  Investment Advisor 76,78 19,78 83,91 76,68  2356
Global Region  C8=North America 74,64 29,37 54,95 55,01  3498
Country  C7=United States 69,32 26,86 55,80 52,37  3199
Turnover  C5=Mod  35,96 8,90 87,36 48,79  1060
Turnover  C5=Low  28,23 6,65 91,79 44,49  792
Style  C4=Core Value  20,00 5,00 86,55 34,99  595
Style  C4=Core Growth 17,71 4,32 88,72 33,51  514
Style  C4=GARP  18,56 5,09 78,88 31,05  606
Style  C4=Growth  10,52 2,85 79,71 23,20  340
Turnover  C5=High  25,32 11,62 47,11 22,61  1384
Investor Type  C3=Private Equity 8,27 2,87 62,28 16,44  342
Style  C4=VC/Private Equi 8,12 2,82 62,20 16,26  336
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